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Abstract  
Vietnam’s extensive social security system is claimed to have played a key role in the extraordinary 
poverty decline over the past decades. This claim is, however, not substantiated by empirical evidence. 
In this study, we investigate how well contributory pensions and social allowances reached the poor 
and to which extent these transfers affected poverty and inequality in the early 2000s. Using fixed-
effect regression to avoid endogeneity bias and allowing for different effects of different types of 
transfers, we find that the impact of these transfers on poverty and inequality was low, due to low 
coverage of poor and relatively low amounts transferred to the poor. Contrary to studies for other 
countries, our estimates suggest that public transfers did not crowd out private transfers nor did they 
result in a decrease in work effort. We do find weak evidence for multiplier effects for social transfers, 
but not for pensions.  
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The Impact of Public Transfers on Poverty and 
Inequality: Evidence from rural Vietnam 
1. Introduction 
Cash transfers have become an increasingly popular strategy of combating poverty 
and inequality. They are perceived as being more adaptable to the specific needs of 
individual beneficiaries, more empowering and less stigmatizing than transfers in 
kind. Cash transfers essentially are an additional source of income that can be freely 
spend by the recipients. 
Besides increasing income of the beneficiaries, cash transfer programs can 
also have important positive indirect effects. The money transferred may be used to 
acquire productive inputs or to invest in productive assets, generating multipliers on 
the cash received (Sadoulet et al. 2001; Farrington and Slater 2006; Lloyd-Sherlock 
2006) In the absence of effective collective arrangements to manage risk, poor 
households cannot afford a major setback, and so will often choose to manage their 
livelihoods so as to minimize their exposure to risk, even if this results in low average 
returns (Conway and Norton 2002). The ultimate consequence of this behavior may 
be that households are trapped in poverty (Carter and Barrett 2006). Cash transfers for 
social protection therefore supposedly encourage moderate risk-taking behavior, 
allowing income growth and asset accumulation (Devereux 2002). Other cash 
transfers can have the same effect, as they guarantee a minimum income level and 
thus provide security. Transfers may also cause positive indirect effects through other 
channels than risk mitigation. When households are devoid of reliable sources of 
credit, cash transfers may allow them to intensify or expand there production beyond 
a scale they would otherwise have been able to obtain (Sadoulet et al. 2001).  
Empirical evidence supports these multiplier-generating indirect effects of 
public transfers. Sadoulet et al. (2001) find short-run income multipliers in the range 
of 1.5-2.6 for cash transfers to compensate Mexican farm households for the 
anticipated negative price effects of trade liberalization on basic crops. Likewise, 
Devereux (2002) finds evidence that even tiny income transfers are often invested in 
income-generating activities, education, social networks, or acquisition of productive 
assets in three Southern African case studies. 
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On the other hand, there may also be negative indirect effects of cash transfer 
programs. Transfers supposedly provide disincentives to work effort (Farrington and 
Slater 2006; Lloyd-Sherlock 2006; Sahn and Alderman 1996). Recipients may 
become dependent on social transfers, and fall into poverty when no longer receiving 
assistance (Dreze 2005). Moreover, there is evidence that public transfers crowd-out 
private transfers (Jensen 2004; Maitra and Ray 2003). As a result, income may 
increase by less than the transferred amount of money. 
As both positive and negative indirect effects may be important, the 
quantitative effects of public transfers on the income of recipients are not a priori 
known. After-transfer income may be higher as well as lower than the sum of 
transfers and counterfactual income, i.e.  income had there not been transfers.  
Moreover, given total income, the effect of transfers on expenditures may be different 
than for earned income. Often, social transfers and earned income accrue to different 
persons. These persons may have different preferences and pooling may be imperfect 
(Maitra and Ray 2003). Therefore, to assess the impact of public transfers, we need to 
carefully determine the counterfactuals for both income and consumption.  
This is not straightforward, as obviously there are no data for what would 
have been the outcome had households not received transfers. Simply comparing 
transfer recipients with a control group mostly does not solve the problem. Both 
groups are likely to be systematically different, unless some randomization of transfer 
assignment is applied. Randomization is, however, mostly considered unethical for 
anti-poverty measures and therefore not applied. Using regression techniques, it is 
relatively easy to correct for between-group and between household differences that 
are observed by the researchers. Yet, some relevant variables may be unobserved. For 
example, people with good government contacts may receive more transfers and at 
the same time get more earned income from the same resources. In this paper, we use 
panel data techniques to control for these unobserved variables.  
This is, however, not enough to assess the impact of public transfers on 
poverty and inequality. Generally not all beneficiaries belong to the target group. 
Barrientos and DeJong (2006), for example, observe that 20-40 percent of 
beneficiaries in three different cash transfer programs to support poor households 
with children of school age were among the non-poor. Leakage rates are also high in 
developed countries, where the poor tend to receive less from social security 
programs than people from middle and high income groups We therefore need to 
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consider the distribution of transfers over the population to go from average impact to 
changes in poverty and inequality.   
The objective of this paper is to examine how well social security transfers 
including pensions and social allowances reach the rural poor in Vietnam and to 
which extent these transfers affect household welfare, poverty and inequality. 
Vietnam has committed itself to a “growth with equity” strategy of development. The 
country has achieved high economic growth, with annual GDP growth rates of around 
6 percent over the past 10 years. Poverty rates have declined remarkably from 58 to 
20 percent between 1993 and 2004. The mass media claim that the extensive social 
security system maintained by the government has played a key role in this decline. 
Yet the few existing evaluation studies of the system do not support this 
claim. Van de Walle (2002) has analyzed the performance of Vietnam’s public safety 
net during the 1990s. She found that social insurance and subsidies were badly 
targeted at the poor, with percentages of households receiving benefits being similar 
across expenditure quintiles. Social transfers helped to reduce the poverty incidence 
by less than three percentage points. The efficiency of the system may, however, have 
improved since then. Evans et al. (2006) suggest that some improvements have 
indeed taken place. In 2004, the proportion of households receiving benefits was 
highest for the poorest groups at least for some categories of social security benefits. 
Moreover, Evans et al. conclude that in this year poverty rates would have been 
almost five percent higher in the absence of social security payments. However, they 
compute this estimate by comparing actual poverty rates with poverty rates based on 
counterfactual expenditures calculated by simply subtracting social transfers from 
actual expenditures. As explained above, the results are therefore likely to be biased, 
and the bias may be positive as well as negative.  
We contribute to these studies by assessing the impact of pensions and social 
allowances on poverty and inequality in the early 2000s, while correcting for 
potential biases due to the indirect effects of transfers and the endogeneity of transfer 
allocation. Also, contrary to Van de Walle, we allow for differences in impact for 
different types of transfers. We use the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
2002 and 2004. These surveys form a panel of more than 3000 rural households, 
which allows us to estimate the impact of public transfers accounting for 
characteristics that are either observed or unobserved but stable between the two 
survey rounds. We find that the effect of the transfers on poverty was still relatively 
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low. Perhaps surprisingly, the effect was highest for pensions, which have lower 
prevalence among the poor but cover higher amounts than social allowances. The 
impact of transfers on inequality was negligible.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we introduce the data 
used in this paper. The third section describes poverty, inequality, and public transfers 
in rural Vietnam. The fourth section presents the methodology we used to measure 
the impact of the transfers. In the fifth section we present the empirical findings, and 
finally the sixth section concludes.  
2. Data 
The study relies on data from the two recent Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Surveys (VHLSS), which were conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
(GSO) with technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years 2002 and 2004. 
For the descriptive statistics, we also use two previous rounds of the VHLSS, 
conducted in 1993 and 1998. 
The 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs covered 30000 and 9000 households, 
respectively. The samples are representative for the national, rural and urban, and 
regional levels. The 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs set up a panel of 4000 households, 
which are representative for the whole country, and for the urban and rural 
population.  
The surveys collected information through household and community level 
questionnaires. Information on households includes basic demography, employment 
and labor force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed 
assets and durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs, 
and especially information on pensions and social allowances that households had 
received during the 12 months before the interview. In the rare cases that pensions 
and social allowances are provided in kind, VHLSS reports their equivalent estimated 
values.  
Expenditure and income per capita are collected using very detailed 
questionnaires in VHLSS. Expenditure includes food and non-food expenditure. Food 
expenditure includes purchased food and foodstuff and self-produced products of 
households. Non-food expenditure comprises expenditure on education, healthcare 
expenditure, expenditure on houses and commodities, and expenditure on power, 
water supply and garbage. Regarding to income, household income can come from 
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any source. Income includes income from agricultural and non-agricultural 
production, salary, wage, pensions, scholarship, income from loan interest and house 
rental, remittances and social transfers. Income from agricultural production 
comprises crop income, livestock income, aquaculture income, and income from 
other agriculture-related activities.   
Information on commune characteristics was collected from 2960 and 2181 
communes in the 2002 and 2004 surveys, respectively. This data can be linked with 
the household data. Commune data includes demography, general economic 
conditions and aid programs, non-farm employment, agriculture production, local 
infrastructure and transportation, education, health and health facilities, and social 
problems. In the 2004 VHLSS, commune data are only available for rural areas.  
This study focuses on the rural population. The main reason is that we use 
commune variables in the regression analysis. In addition, poverty in Vietnam is 
mostly a rural phenomenon, with 95 percent of all poor living in rural areas in 2004. 
The number of households in the rural panel for 2002-2004 is 3099. 
A household is classified as poor if their per capita expenditure is below the 
poverty line set up by WB and GSO. The poverty line is equivalent to the expenditure 
level that allows for nutritional needs and some essential non-food consumption such 
as clothing and housing. This poverty line was first estimated in 1993. Poverty lines 
in the following years were estimated by deflating the 1993 poverty line using 
consumer price indexes. The poverty lines for the years 1993, 1998, 2002, and 2004 
are 1160, 1790, 1917, and 2077 thousands VND, respectively. 
3. Poverty and public transfers in rural Vietnam 
Poverty rates declined continuously over the period 1993-2004 (Figure 1). The 
proportion of poor dropped dramatically from 58 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 
1998 and continued to decrease to 29 and 20 percent in 2002 and 2004, respectively. 
In rural areas, however, poverty was more prevalent than the country-average, with a 
poverty rate of 25 percent in 2004. The reduction of poverty was associated with a 
moderate increase in inequality. The Gini index increased from 0.33 in 1993 to 0.37 
in 2004. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1>> 
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As indicated before, social security can play an important role in poverty reduction. 
Vietnam’s social security net includes a large number of programs. Part of these 
programs are contribution-based. A major criticism of such programs is that they 
exclude groups without substantial periods of formal sector employment, thus 
minimizing their coverage of poor and vulnerable social groups (Lloyd-Sherlock 
2006).  Other schemes are specifically designed to reduce economic shocks and 
poverty, and may therefore be expected to have rendered a larger contribution to 
Vietnam’s poverty reduction. 
Contribution-based social insurance covers mandatory health insurance and 
pensions. Since 1995, both health insurance and pensions are compulsory for 
employees in State organizations, State-owned enterprises, and private enterprises 
with ten employees or more (Evans et al., 2006). To cover costs, employers deduct a 
portion of employees’ monthly salary to pay contributions. In order not to complicate 
issues, we focus on pensions only. Pensions have existed since 1962, but before 1995  
they covered only the State sector (Giang, 2004). Pensions include several types of 
benefits, such as maternity benefits, sickness assistance, assistance in case of 
occupational injury or disease, payments for job loss and redundancy, monthly 
pensions for the retired, and life insurance. Most of pension benefits are paid in cash.1  
The most important non-contributory schemes are the National Targeted 
Programs (NTPs) and social allowances. The NTPs are government programs with 
the specific objective to reduce poverty. The NTPs provide the poor with support for, 
e.g., education, health, production, and construction of infrastructure. Support under 
the umbrella of the NPTs is very diverse and often in kind and difficult to convert to 
money values. In this paper, we therefore focus on social allowances. These cover 
support to disadvantaged groups, such as war invalids, people who gained merit 
during the war, old people, and children without guardians, disabled people, and 
households adversely affected by natural calamities. Most social allowances are 
disbursed in cash, but in rare cases, support takes the form of food, clothes, 
production inputs and materials for housing repairs, etc.2 
 The impact of pensions and social allowances on poverty and inequality 
depends on the distribution of the benefits over the population. The distribution of 
pensions is clearly progressive. Richer households receive a more than proportional 
                                                 
1
 For more information on the Vietnamese pension scheme, see Government of Vietnam, 1993a, 
1993b, 1995, 1998 and 2003. 
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share of pensions, as they are both more likely to receive pensions and get a higher 
amount of pension on average (Table 1). Overall, nine percent of households received 
benefits, but this was only four and six percent for the lowest two expenditure 
quintiles. Nevertheless, for those households receiving pensions, pensions covered on 
average about thirty percent of total income. This pattern did not change between 
2002 and 2004. 
As most pensions are targeted at the elderly, Table 2 presents pensions of the 
poor and non-poor households for those with at least one member older than 60 years. 
In the period 2002-2004, this type of households accounted for around thirty percent 
of all households. While the coverage of pensions over households with elderly was 
higher than for the total population, the distribution over the expenditure quintiles 
was similar. 
 
<<INSERT TABLES 1 & 2>> 
 
 As expected, social allowances were somewhat more pro-poor than pensions 
(Table 3). While the share of households receiving social allowances was nine 
percent, and therefore almost identical to the share of households receiving pensions, 
fifteen percent of the lowest expenditure quintile received transfers, compared to six 
percent of the highest quintile. Yet, the average amount received sharply increases 
with total expenditures. Overall, the contribution of transfers tot household income is 
low compared to the contribution of pensions: fourteen percent on average.   
 Summarizing, the poor received both pensions and social allowances, but a 
large share of both went to non-poor households. However, the analysis is ex post and 
does not take into account that the assignment of households to expenditure quintiles 
is done after accounting for public transfers. Pensions and social allowances may 
have lifted out of poverty. In order to test this hypothesis, we need to estimate 
household income in the absence of these transfers. This is what we will do in the 
remainder of this paper.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 3>> 
 
                                                                                                                                           
2
 For more information on social allowances in Vietnam, see Government of Vietnam, 1993b, 2003. 
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4. Assessing the treatment effect 
4.1. Parameters of interest  
We use two indicators to measure the impact of the pensions and social transfers. The 
first is the expected impact of these transfers on the recipients, which also known as 
the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). Since the size of transfers differ 
across the population, looking at receipt alone does not tell the whole story. Our 
second indicator therefore refers to the expected effect of a small increase in transfer 
size for recipients. This is called the Average Partial Effect on the Treated (APET). 
To define ATT, denote D as the treatment variable i.e., D equals the amount of 
transfers received. Further let Y denote the observed value of outcome, i.e., household 
income and consumption expenditure in this paper, and let Y(D) denote potential 
outcome corresponding to the value of D. ATT can now be formalized as: 
)0()0()0( )0()0()( >−>=>−= == DYEDYEDYYEATT DDDD ,   (1) 
where the final term denotes the outcome of recipients had they not received 
treatment. This is unobserved, and the challenge of a good impact evaluation is to 
construct an accurate estimate of this counterfactual.  
Please note that our formalization differs slightly from the standard definition, 
which assumes a binary treatment variable. We use a continuous variable, as we are 
also interested the effect of a small change in the level of transfers. The change in 
impact due a change in the amount of transfers from d to d+δ is defined as: 
[ ] [ ]0)()(0),( >=−+==>∆ DdDYdDYEDdE δδ .    (2) 
Dividing the right-hand side of (2) by δ, we obtain the second impact indicator used 
in this study; the Average Partial Effect on the Treated (APET): 
[ ]
δ
δ
δ
0)()(
),(
>=−+=
=
ccc
d
DdDYdDYE
APET .     (3) 
 APET can be regarded as the average marginal treatment effect measured at 
transfer amount d. If [ ]0)( >cc DDYE  is a continuous and differentiable function 
oDcf >  of cD , the APET is simply the derivative of )( coD Df c >  with respect to cD . 
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4.2. Measurement of impact on households’ expenditure and income 
The most common functional form for income and expenditure functions is log-
linear: 
iii XY εβα ++=)ln( ,       (4)  
where X are observed households and location characteristics and ε is an error term 
including characteristics that are unobserved by the researchers. A requirement for 
standard regression methods to give unbiased parameter estimates is that these 
unobserved characteristics are not correlated with the X variables.  
 
This requirement is likely to be violated in the case of transfers. Transfer-
receiving households may be systematically different from other households. For 
example, households with social allowances may be less sturdy or have better 
political contacts than households without transfers. Put differently, ordinary least-
squares regression of outcome functions including social transfers will results in 
biased estimates of transfer impact.  
In this study, we use the panel nature of the data to minimize such bias. The 
main assumption underlying this method is that the relevant unobserved variables 
remained unchanged during the period covered by the panel, in this case 2002-2004. 
While we expect that between these years transfers respond significantly to changes 
in family composition, which are observed and included in the regressions, we 
assume that the unobserved characteristics correlated with both income/expenditures 
and transfers have remained unchanged over this relatively brief period.    
The estimated equations can thus be formulated as follows:  
itititiit DXY εγβα +++=)ln( ,       (5)  
where α is the household effect covering both observed and unobserved time-
invariant household and commune characteristic. X includes information on 
demography, household assets, housing, education, employment, infrastructure, and 
socioeconomic commune characteristics. D is a vector of the amount of pensions and 
social allowances received. We include these as separate variables, as they may 
accrue to different (types of) persons with different preferences and bargaining 
power. The error term εit and D are assumed to be distributed independently. Fixed-
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effect regression thus gives unbiased estimates of the coefficients of this function and 
of the effect of transfers on income and expenditures. 
The estimator of the ATT can now be expressed as follows: 
{ } 01)0|ˆ()0|( ˆ)ln()0( >∀−=>−>= ∑ −= itDYit
p
D DeY
n
DYEDYEATT itti γ ,  (6) 
where np is the number of cases with transfer receipts. 
Similarly, the estimator of the APET is: 
( ) 01ˆ >∀==





∂
∂
= ∑ itit
p
DY
n
YE
D
YEAPET γγ .     (7) 
For sake of comparison between groups, we can also estimate group-based 
APETs at a certain level of D = d: 
( )[ ] 0ˆ1 ˆˆ)ln()( >∀= ∑ +−= itdDY
p
dD De
n
APET itti γγγ ,              (8) 
where D is the observed amount of transfers, and d is the transfer amount that weare 
interested in. The standard error of the estimates can be calculated using the Delta 
method or bootstrap technique.  
4.3. Measurement of impact on poverty and inequality 
In this paper, poverty is measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes, 
which can all be calculated using the following formula (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 
1984): 
 
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes.,    
      (9) 
 
where Y is a welfare indicator (consumption expenditure per capita in this paper), z is 
the poverty line, n is the number of people in the sample population, q is the number 
of poor people, and α can be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion. When α 
= 0, we have the headcount index H which measures the proportion of people below 
the poverty line. When α = 1 and α = 2, we have the poverty gap PG which measures 
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the depth of poverty, and the squared poverty gap P2 which measures the severity of 
poverty, respectively. 
To measure the inequality, we use three common measures of inequality: the 
Gini coefficient, Theil’s L index of inequality, and Theil’s T index of inequality. The 
Gini index can be calculated from the individual expenditure in the population as 
follows:  
 
∑∑
= =
−
−
=
n
i
n
j
ji YYYnn
G
1 1)1(2
1
                                  (10) 
 
where Y  is the average per capita expenditure.   
The value of the Gini coefficient varies from 0 when everyone has the same 
expenditure to 1 when one person has everything. The closer a Gini coefficient is to 
one, the more unequal is the expenditure distribution.  
The Theil L index of inequality is calculated as follows: 
 
∑
=






=
n
i iY
Y
n
LTheil
1
ln1_ ,                        (11) 
 
The Theil L index ranges from 0 to infinity, and the higher the value of Theil L, the 
higher the inequality is. 
The Theil T index of inequality is calculated as: 
 
 ∑
=






=
n
i
ii
Y
Y
Y
Y
n
TTheil
1
ln1_                         (12) 
 
The Theil T index ranges from 0 (lowest inequality) to ln(N) (highest inequality).  
Impact of transfers on an index I of poverty or inequality is expressed as 
follows: 
 
)()( )0( =−=∆ DYIYII ,                           (13) 
 
where I(Y) is the standard index for the total rural population, which can be estimated 
directly from the sample data. )( )0( =DYI , however, is the relevant index in the absence 
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of transfers. This term is only observed for non-recipient households. For recipient, it 
is estimated using the fixed-effect regression for recipients.  
 We also estimated the impact of transfers on the indexes for recipients only: 
 
),0(),0( )0( =>−>=∆ DYDIYDII ,        (14) 
 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the actual index for transfer recipients, 
which is observed in the data. The second term on the right-hand side, however, is the 
counterfactual, which must be estimated using the regression results.  
5. Results 
In this section, we discuss the estimated effects of pensions and social allowances on 
household expenditure and income and on aggregate poverty and inequality. The 
fixed-effect regressions underlying these estimates are presented in the annex.  
5.1. Impact on household expenditure and income    
Pensions on average increased per capita income of the recipients by 1451 thousand 
VND or 40 percent, while social allowances increased per capita income by 428 
thousand VND or approximately 12 percent (Table 4). Given that mean household 
size was about five, total household income on average increased by 87 percent of the 
transferred amount for pensions and by 119 percent of the transferred amount for 
social allowances. Yet, neither of these numbers is significantly different from 100, 
which implies that they do not support multiplier effects nor crowding out of private 
transfers or lower work effort.     
 
<<INSERT TABLE 4>> 
 
Computed at the actual level of transfers, an extra VND would on average have 
resulted in an increase of 0.26 VND and 0.31 VND in per capita income for pensions 
and social allowances, respectively (Table 5). Considering that the average pension-
receiving household consists of five persons and the average allowance-receiving 
household of 5.5 persons, this implies that household-level APETs are 1.3  and 1.7. 
While the first is not significantly different from one, the second presents some 
evidence for multiplier effects for social allowances.  
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<<INSERT TABLE 5>> 
 
The impact of public transfers on expenditures was much lower than the impact 
on income (Table 6). Pensions increased per capita expenditure of recipients by 14 
percent and social allowances by 5 percent. The ratio of the expenditure increase to 
the value of transfers was 31 percent for pensions and 34 percent of social 
allowances. This suggests that about two thirds of both pensions and social 
allowances were saved or used for long-term investment. The APETs give similar 
results: 0.41 and 0.45 at the household level for pensions and social allowances, 
respectively (Table 5). These numbers are in line with Van de Walle (2002) who 
finds a propensity to consume out of public transfers of  0.37 for Vietnam in the 
1990s using a linear but otherwise similar consumption function3.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 6>> 
 
 When comparing the impact estimates for poor and non-poor households, all 
effects are significantly lower for poor households (Tables 4-6). This could indicate 
that for poor households, public transfers did crowd-out private transfers or that the 
poor significantly decreased work effort when they get public transfers. Yet, are 
hesitant to draw this conclusion, as these findings may be driven by the functional 
form of the regression equations.  
5.2. Impact on Poverty and Inequality    
Despite the low share of poor households receiving pensions compared to social 
allowances, the impact of pensions on poverty was higher (Table 7).  Pensions 
reduced the poverty incidence (P0) of recipients by around 5.5 percentage points, and 
they decreased both the poverty gap index (P1) and poverty severity index (P2) by 
around 50 percent. The effect of pensions total rural poverty is significant, but 
extremely small, as only 3.5 percent of poor households received transfers.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 7>> 
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Possibly due to their small size, social allowances did not significantly reduce 
the incidence of poverty. Yet a relatively large share of allowances did reach the poor, 
and although these transfers did not help them escape from poverty, they did reduce 
the poverty gap and severity indexes of recipients by around 6 percent. The impact of 
social allowances on total rural poverty, was however, extremely small.  
Pensions and social allowances had very little impact, if any, on inequality. 
Inequality of the total rural population increased by about one percent due to pensions 
and was not significantly affected by social allowances (Table 7). Inequality between 
recipients did not change significantly due to either type of transfer and is therefore 
not presented in the tables.  
6. Conclusion 
Vietnam’s extensive social security system is claimed to have played a key role in the 
extraordinary poverty decline over the past decades. This claim is, however, not 
substantiated by empirical evidence. Van de Walle (2002) found that social insurance 
and subsidies were badly targeted at the poor and helped to reduce the poverty 
incidence by less than three percentage points during the 1990s. Evans et al. (2006) 
suggest that the effects were somewhat larger in 2004, when poverty rates would have 
been almost five percent higher in the absence of social security payments. However, 
they use naïve estimates, which are likely to be biased.  
In this study, we investigate how well contributory pensions and social 
allowances reached the poor and to which extent these transfers affected poverty and 
inequality in the early 2000s. We estimate the effect of the transfers on both income 
and expenditure. Neither is straightforward. Cash transfers do not necessarily result in 
an increase in income with the same value as the transfer. On the one hand, public 
transfers may crowd out private transfers and lead to a reduction of work effort. On 
the other hand, they may have positive multiplier effects, when (part of) the money is 
used for production or investment. At the same time, the propensity to consume is not 
necessarily the same for transfers and earned income, as they may accrue to different 
persons with different preferences and money may not be perfectly pooled. Last but 
                                                                                                                                           
3
 They find a propensity to consume of 0.45 for a linear (first difference) consumption function 
including transfers as the sole explanatory variable and of 0.72 when they use first-period transfers as 
an instrument for the change in transfers. However, we find neither specification credible.  
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not least, estimating the effect of transfers on income and expenditures will give 
biased estimates unless the endogeneity of transfer allocation is accounted for.   
Using fixed-effect regression to avoid endogeneity bias and allowing for 
different effects of different types of transfers, we find that the impact of these 
transfers on poverty and inequality was low, due to low coverage of poor and 
relatively low amounts transferred to the poor. Contrary to studies for other countries, 
our estimates suggest that public transfers did not crowd out private transfers nor did 
they result in a decrease in work effort. We do find weak evidence for multiplier 
effects for social transfers, but not for pensions.  
Our estimates for the impact on poverty rates during the early 2000s is even lower than 
the estimate of Van de Walle (2002) for the 1990s. This does not necessarily mean that the 
impact of the transfers has decreased, although of course the strong decrease in poverty could 
imply that it became more difficult to eliminate the remaining poverty. Differences in 
research approach may also explain the different results: while Van de Walle mingles all 
public transfers, we focus on the impact of two different types only. 
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Figure 1: Poverty rate over the period 1993-2004 (in percent) (Estimates using VHLSS data).  
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Table 1: Pensions by expenditure quintiles 
Indicators 
2002 2004 
Poorest Near 
Poorest 
Middle Near 
Richest 
Richest All Poorest Near 
Poorest 
Middle Near 
Richest 
Richest All 
% receiving households 
3.6 5.7 8.9 11.2 13.8 8.6 3.4 6.6 6.6 11.4 16.9 9.0 
[0.4] [0.5] [0.6] [0.7] [0.8] [0.3] [0.5] [0.7] [0.7] [0.9] [1.2] [0.4] 
Transfer amount* 
(thousand VND) 
3000.1 3527.9 4292.5 4836.9 6249.0 4851.7 3653.1 5393.6 5235.0 6961.9 8452.9 6782.7 
[203.8] [148.4] [181.0] [173.8] [247.7] [116.6] [354.3] [537.9] [415.0] [338.4] [418.7] [223.9] 
% of transfers over 
household expenditure 
44.3 44.5 48.1 44.8 34.7 40.1 50.2 55.9 46.0 52.5 41.8 46.0 
[4.0] [2.6] [2.4] [2.0] [1.6] [1.1] [4.9] [5.9] [3.6] [3.2] [2.6] [1.8] 
% of transfers over 
household income 
29.3 31.8 34.8 34.5 27.6 30.8 34.1 33.9 34.3 38.0 32.1 33.9 
[2.6] [1.8] [1.7] [1.6] [1.2] [0.8] [2.9] [3.4] [2.7] [2.2] [1.8] [1.2] 
Note: * in 2004.prices 
Source: Own Estimation using VHLSSs 2002 and 2004. 
 
Table 2: Pensions by expenditure quintiles for households with at least a member older than 60 years old 
Indicators 
2002 2004 
Poorest Near 
Poorest 
Middle Near 
Richest 
Richest All Poorest Near 
Poorest 
Middle Near 
Richest 
Richest All 
% households with 
member older than 60 
28.3 28.5 28.9 29.7 28.7 28.8 33.3 28.7 27.0 30.2 30.3 29.9 
[0.9] [0.9] [0.9] [0.9] [1.0] [0.4] [1.3] [1.3] [1.3] [1.4] [1.3] [0.6] 
% receiving households 
7.6 11.3 16.7 21.6 24.2 16.3 7.9 13.1 13.5 21.3 29.0 16.9 
[1.0] [1.1] [1.4] [1.7] [1.9] [0.7] [1.3] [1.8] [1.8] [2.2] [2.5] [0.9] 
Distribution of amount 
5.5 9.8 18.1 25.8 40.7 100 5.3 11.7 10.4 26.7 45.9 100 
[0.8] [1.2] [2.0] [2.4] [3.1]         [1.1] [2.0] [1.9] [3.1] [3.8]         
% of transfers over 
household expenditure 
47.5 50.5 53.5 50.3 40.2 45.7 53.1 62.6 50.3 58.3 49.8 53.1 
[4.7] [4.0] [3.6] [3.0] [2.5] [1.7] [6.2] [6.6] [5.1] [4.3] [3.9] [2.5] 
% of transfers over 
household income 
31.0 34.3 39.2 39.1 33.3 35.6 35.9 39.5 36.8 42.8 37.8 39.0 
[3.2] [3.0] [2.3] [2.3] [1.9] [1.2] [3.5] [3.4] [3.9] [3.1] [2.7] [1.7] 
Note: * in 2004.prices 
Source: Own Estimation using VHLSSs 2002 and 2004. 
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Table 3: Social allowances by expenditure quintiles 
Indicators 
2002 2004 
Poorest Near 
Poorest 
Middle Near 
Richest 
Richest All Poorest Near 
Poorest 
Middle Near 
Richest 
Richest All 
% receiving households 
14.7 8.9 8.4 7.0 5.9 9.0 15.2 8.6 7.7 7.9 7.6 9.4 
[1.0] [0.6] [0.6] [0.5] [0.5] [0.3] [1.1] [0.8] [0.8] [0.7] [0.8] [0.4] 
Transfer amount* 
(thousand VND) 
786.4 1345.9 1657.1 2043.0 2089.2 1428.0 809.5 1893.3 2007.5 2053.5 2251.8 1645.5 
[65.9] [100.1] [138.6] [145.5] [177.1] [58.0] [84.9] [214.0] [159.9] [144.0] [172.3] [73.2] 
% of transfers over 
household expenditure 
15.6 19.6 21.0 21.5 14.3 18.0 15.5 23.0 18.5 17.8 11.7 16.2 
[1.6] [2.1] [2.7] [2.0] [1.5] [0.9] [1.9] [3.1] [1.8] [2.1] [1.4] [0.9] 
% of transfers over 
household income 
11.5 15.0 16.4 17.1 11.8 14.2 11.4 15.3 13.6 14.0 8.8 12.0 
[1.2] [1.5] [1.9] [1.6] [1.3] [0.7] [1.4] [2.1] [1.4] [1.6] [1.1] [0.7] 
Note: * in 2004.prices 
Source: Own Estimation using VHLSSs 2002 and 2004. 
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Table 4: Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of public transfers on income (thousand VND) 
Group 
Pensions Social allowances 
Y1 Y0 ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
ATT/Y0 
(%) 
ATT/D 
(%) 
Y1 Y0 ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
ATT/Y0 
(%) 
ATT/D 
(%) 
All 5726.0*** 4275.0*** 1451.0*** 33.9*** 87.2*** 3911.8*** 3483.6*** 428.2*** 12.3*** 119*** 
 [223.0] [196.5] [170.8] [4.7] [8.9] [174.2] [160.5] [83.0] [2.5] [22.5] 
Poor 3170.7*** 2403.9*** 766.7*** 31.9*** 65.6*** 1610.9*** 1496.2*** 114.8*** 7.7*** 60.7*** 
 [288.0] [192.0] [208.8] [9.5] [9.5] [60.5] [40.1] [34.3] [2.2] [12.1] 
Non-Poor 6125.3*** 4567.4*** 1557.9*** 34.1*** 89.5*** 5085.1*** 4497*** 588.1*** 13.1*** 131.5*** 
 [240.6] [196.7] [191.2] [4.7] [9.4] [240.0] [199.5] [118.1] [2.6] [26.6] 
Difference   -791.2*** -2.2 -23.9***   -473.3*** -5.4*** -70.8*** 
   [241.6] [9.0] [8.3]   [93.9] [1.5] [16.9] 
Note: D is the amount of pension 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 200 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2002 and 2004 
 
Table 5: Average partial effects (APET) of public transfers on the treated (thousand VND) 
Group 
Pensions Social allowances 
Per capita income Per capita expenditure Per capita income Per capita expenditure 
APET APET at 
program 
mean 
APET APET at 
program 
mean 
APET APET at 
program 
mean 
APET APET at 
program 
mean 
All 0.2611*** 0.2157*** 0.0810*** 0.0746*** 0.3077*** 0.2770*** 0.0815** 0.0783** 
 [0.0331] [0.0238] [0.0211] [0.0181] [0.0628] [0.0524] [0.0352] [0.0328] 
Poor 0.1505*** 0.1276*** 0.0373*** 0.0347*** 0.1198*** 0.1112*** 0.0411** 0.0399** 
 [0.0314] [0.0148] [0.0143] [0.0099] [0.0286] [0.0248] [0.0189] [0.0176] 
Non-Poor 0.2765*** 0.2279*** 0.0871*** 0.0801*** 0.3635*** 0.3262*** 0.0969** 0.0929** 
 [0.0364] [0.0278] [0.0239] [0.0210] [0.0778] [0.0649] [0.0429] [0.0400] 
Difference -0.1260*** -0.1003*** -0.0498*** -0.0454*** -0.2437*** -0.2150*** -0.0557*** -0.0530** 
 
[0.0309] [0.0207] [0.0119] [0.0114] [0.0516] [0.0425] [0.0244] [0.0227] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 200 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2002 and 2004 
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Table 6: Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of public transfers in expenditures (thousand VND) 
Group 
Pensions Social allowances 
Y1 Y0 ATT 
(Y1 – 
Y0) 
ATT/Y0 
(%) 
ATT/D 
(%) 
Y1 Y0 ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
ATT/Y0 
(%) 
ATT/D 
(%) 
All 4200.8*** 3690.2*** 510.7*** 13.8*** 30.7*** 2803.3*** 2682.2*** 121.1** 4.5*** 33.7** 
 [130.0] [163.2] [118.6] [3.6] [7.1] [90.8] [85.3] [51.4] [1.9] [14.3] 
Poor 1904.1*** 1690.6*** 213.5** 12.6** 18.3*** 1507.0*** 1467.5*** 39.5** 2.7** 19.2** 
 [121.5] [58.3] [99.3] [5.8] [6.2] [54.7] [42.9] [20.4] [1.3] [8.9] 
Non-Poor 4559.7*** 4002.6*** 557.1*** 13.9*** 32.0*** 3770.5*** 3588.5*** 182.0** 5.1** 38.3** 
 [142.7] [141.5] [132.5] [3.5] [7.5] [134.3] [108.2] [78.7] [2.2] [16.4] 
Difference   -343.6*** -1.3 -13.7***   -142.5*** -2.4** -19.1*** 
   [87.0] [3.9] [2.9]   [60.7] [1.1] [8.2] 
Note: D is the amount of social allowances 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 200 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2002 and 2004 
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Table 7: Impact on poverty and inequality 
Index 
Impact of pension Impact of social allowances 
With 
transfers 
Without 
transfers 
Impact With 
transfers 
Without 
transfers 
Impact 
Poverty of recipients      
P0 0.0800*** 0.1351*** -0.0551** 0.4060*** 0.4273*** -0.0213 
 [0.0165] [0.0309] [0.0257] [0.0321] [0.0347] [0.0197] 
P1 0.0168*** 0.0251*** -0.0083** 0.1179*** 0.1254*** -0.0075** 
 [0.0046] [0.0066] [0.0039] [0.0119] [0.0119] [0.0032] 
P2 0.0054*** 0.0079*** -0.0025** 0.0492*** 0.0520*** -0.0029** 
 [0.0020] [0.0027] [0.0012] [0.0063] [0.0063] [0.0013] 
Poverty of all rural      
P0 0.2540*** 0.2586*** -0.0047** 0.2540*** 0.2561*** -0.0021 
 [0.0094] [0.0099] [0.0024] [0.0086] [0.0088] [0.0020] 
P1 0.0611*** 0.0618*** -0.0007** 0.0611*** 0.0618*** -0.0007** 
 [0.0028] [0.0029] [0.0003] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0003] 
P2 0.0218*** 0.0220*** -0.0002** 0.0218*** 0.0221*** -0.0003** 
 [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0001] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0001] 
Inequality of all rural      
Gini 0.2902*** 0.2874*** 0.0028*** 0.2902*** 0.2903*** -0.0001 
 [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0008] [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0002] 
Theil L 0.1385*** 0.1360*** 0.0025*** 0.1385*** 0.1386*** -0.0001 
 [0.0046] [0.0045] [0.0007] [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0001] 
Theil T 0.1447*** 0.1426*** 0.0021*** 0.1447*** 0.1449*** -0.0002 
 
[0.0058] [0.0059] [0.0006] [0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0002] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 200 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSSs 2002 and 2004 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Fixed-effect Regressions  
Explanatory variables 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
(thousand 
VND) 
Log of per 
capita income 
(thousand 
VND) 
Pension (thousand VND) 0.00002*** 0.00004*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Social allowance (thousand VND) 0.00002** 0.00006*** 
 [0.00001] [0.00001] 
Ratio of members less than 16 -0.16272** -0.31974*** 
 [0.07295] [0.08714] 
Ratio of members older than 60 -0.27706*** -0.33076*** 
 [0.10190] [0.11136] 
Age of household head 0.02747*** 0.02600*** 
 [0.00847] [0.00933] 
Age of household head squared -0.00023*** -0.00022** 
 [0.00008] [0.00009] 
Household size -0.13989*** -0.16059*** 
 [0.02484] [0.03019] 
Household size squared 0.00505*** 0.00593** 
 [0.00194] [0.00232] 
Head with primary school 0.02503 0.01324 
 [0.02569] [0.02904] 
Head with lower secondary school -0.0143 -0.037 
 [0.03842] [0.04407] 
Head with upper secondary school -0.05714 -0.00697 
 [0.05148] [0.06224] 
Head with technical degree -0.01702 0.00064 
 [0.05422] [0.06983] 
Head with post secondary school -0.04348 0.05289 
 [0.08675] [0.10228] 
Ratio of members with lower secondary school 0.26260*** 0.27900*** 
 [0.05712] [0.06616] 
Ratio of members with upper secondary school 0.60996*** 0.37091*** 
 [0.08521] [0.10546] 
Ratio of members with technical degree 0.71028*** 0.61254*** 
 [0.11606] [0.13298] 
Ratio of members with post secondary school 0.85881*** 0.41601** 
 [0.18127] [0.18500] 
Household having at least a working member -0.01416 0.01392 
 [0.10377] [0.09882] 
Ratio of working members 0.01028 0.26913*** 
 [0.04410] [0.05720] 
Ratio of members working in agriculture -0.13938*** -0.33407*** 
 [0.02876] [0.03403] 
Log of living areas (log of m2) 0.07778*** 0.10600*** 
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Explanatory variables 
Log of per 
capita 
expenditure 
(thousand 
VND) 
Log of per 
capita income 
(thousand 
VND) 
 [0.01755] [0.02151] 
Living in permanent house 0.12833*** 0.19114*** 
 [0.02816] [0.03982] 
Living in semi-permanent house 0.06310*** 0.08704*** 
 [0.01855] [0.02392] 
Area of annual crop land (m2) 0.00000*** 0.00001*** 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Area of perennial crop land (m2) 0 0 
 [0.00000] [0.00000] 
Area of aquaculture water surface (m2) 0.00001 0.00002** 
 [0.00000] [0.00001] 
Commune having non-farm activities -0.03919* -0.03873 
 [0.02086] [0.02548] 
Distance to nearest town (km) 0.00111 -0.00009 
 [0.00117] [0.00123] 
Distance to nearest road (km) 0.00264 -0.0004 
 [0.00504] [0.00700] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) -0.00004 0.00280* 
 [0.00110] [0.00146] 
Distance to nearest periodic market (km) -0.00091 -0.0022 
 [0.00120] [0.00145] 
Distance to nearest post (km) -0.00383*** -0.00348* 
 [0.00127] [0.00179] 
Distance to nearest primary school (km) 0.01011** 0.02439*** 
 [0.00507] [0.00726] 
Distance to nearest lower secondary school (km) -0.00382* -0.00685** 
 [0.00211] [0.00330] 
Distance to nearest upper secondary school (km) 0.00514*** 0.00366** 
 [0.00113] [0.00175] 
Constant 7.37903*** 7.51188*** 
 [0.24511] [0.27008] 
Observations 6198 6198 
R-squared 0.444 0.465 
 
 
